

SENATE.....No. 55.

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**Commonwealth of Massachusetts.**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *Jan. 17, 1842.*

*Ordered,* That the Committee on Rail-roads and Canals, be instructed to inquire into the causes of the frequent accidents upon the Western rail-road,—and that they report the result of their inquiry; and, also, that they take into consideration the expediency of enacting such laws as will have a tendency to prevent a recurrence of similar accidents.

Sent up for concurrence,

L. S. CUSHING, *Clerk.*

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SENATE, *Jan. 18, 1842.*

Concurred,

CHAS. CALHOUN, *Clerk.*

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**Commonwealth of Massachusetts.**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *Jan. 26, 1842.*

*Ordered,* That the Committee on "Rail-roads and Canals," in their examination in relation to the accidents upon the Western Rail-road, be empowered to send for persons and papers.

Sent up for concurrence,

L. S. CUSHING, *Clerk.*

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SENATE, *Jan. 27, 1842.*

Concurred :

CHAS. CALHOUN, *Clerk.*

## Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

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SENATE, *Feb.* 18, 1842.

The Committee on Railways and Canals, to whom were referred the orders of the House of Representatives, of January 17th and 26th, 1842, instructing them to inquire into the causes of frequent accidents on the Western Rail-road, and report the result,—also, that they consider the expediency of enacting such laws as will tend to prevent a recurrence of similar accidents, with power to send for persons and papers, have considered the same, and

### R E P O R T :

That as soon as their other duties would admit, they summoned the corporation above-named to give them what information they might possess in relation to the subject-matter of these orders. The agent and engineer of the Western Rail-road, and Mr. Wilson, of the House of Representatives, who introduced the orders, appeared before the committee.

Their attention was directed to several specific accidents which had happened on that road, viz :

- 1st. One at West Brookfield, in winter of 1840.
- 2d. “ Springfield, in December, 1840.
- 3d. “ Chester, in October, 1841.
- 4th. “ Richmond, in February, 1842.

1. In relation to the first, at West Brookfield, by which a man was killed by the engine, the facts are these. It was a time of deep snow,—the travelled road crossed the track of the rail-road,—in approaching the track, it is supposed that his attention was arrested by a party who were coming towards him

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from the opposite direction, that he endeavored to turn out to let the party pass, turned on to the track and was run over by the engine, without any fault of the engine-man, or any other person connected with the rail-road. It is said, further, that the person killed was deaf, and did not, probably, hear the bell which was rung to give the alarm. The committee do not learn that any blame attaches to any one for this accident.

2. By the accident which occurred at Springfield, in Dec. 1840, several lives were lost, and a large amount of property.

It appeared that the agent, or engineer, having a new and very powerful engine, sent it to some station east of Springfield, to bring into Springfield a large number of loaded freight cars. The directions given by the engineer to the persons who took this matter in charge, were, to bring the cars, amounting in all to between 30 and 40, to a point east of Springfield, near which the inclined plane begins to descend into the village, then to divide the train, first bringing down a part, then returning with the engine, and bringing down the remainder. The whole train came down the plane with great violence, and with the most disastrous effects.

The explanation given of this is, that the state of the weather was such, together with the smoke from the engine, that the engine-man could not determine where the point was at which he was to stop the train—that the train acquired such velocity before he was aware of it—and there not being, then, breaks upon the freight cars, with occasional exceptions, and but two or three breakmen to the whole train, it was impossible to stop it; that, at that time, the Western rail-road and Worcester rail-road were using a certain number of each other's freight cars, indiscriminately—and that the Worcester cars had no breaks upon them, and a large number of the Worcester rail-road cars were in this train, at the time of the accident. Since this occurrence, breaks have been attached to every car for passengers or freight, and a breakman to every two or three cars; and the committee are satisfied that no accident need again occur, from the want of breaks.

3. The accident at Westfield occurred on the 5th October, 1841. The opposite trains met, and the terrible consequences were immediately made known to the public. It appeared that the road had been opened but the day before, (on the 4th Oct.) to the State line, that the cars had run over the whole route but once before the day of the accident; that this collision was produced by the conductor, who was coming from the west, disregarding the rules which he had in his possession, for his government, and against the remonstrance of the engineer on the same train; that the train could not proceed further east, from the Chester station, without imminent danger, as the train was long behind its time; if the rule had been regarded, no accident could have happened.

In addition to the *standing rule* for running, additional instructions were prepared by the engineer, Mr. Whistler, at Springfield, the evening preceding the accident, to be forwarded by the conductor who was to leave Springfield for the west, on the morning of the 5th October, to the conductor of the train coming from the west to Springfield, on the same 5th of October. The trains were to meet at Pittsfield, and there the letter of instructions was to be delivered. The trains did meet at Pittsfield; the conductors saw and conversed with each other; yet, by some negligence, forgetfulness, or other cause unaccounted for to the satisfaction of the committee, the letter was not delivered, and the instructions contained in the undelivered letter, which, if delivered, must have controlled the action of the conductor and prevented the disaster, were not received. If this letter had been delivered, it would seem incredible that the conductor should not have been governed by it. It also seems incredible that he was not governed by the already known standing rule, contained in the time-table in his hands, which should have equally determined him from proceeding, when he was so long behind his regular time, without using some precaution to ascertain whether he could proceed with safety. The committee are satisfied that there was gross and unwarrantable recklessness on the part of the con-

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ductor, coming east, in exposing the lives of the passengers who had entrusted themselves to his care ; and the fact of his losing his own life, alone prevents them from a stronger expression of their convictions of what would be the duty of the corporation, and the public, in the premises, under other circumstances.

The facts, so far as they came to the knowledge of the public, are contained in a report of a committee of the citizens of Springfield, on this subject, published October 9, 1841, which report is herewith submitted, marked A. And the committee must leave it to the legislature and the public to judge whether that matter is sufficiently explained.

The only question with which the committee have to do, as they conceive, is,—are the agents of the Western rail-road chargeable with any negligence in the discharge of their duties, which should expose them to the censure of the public ; and can the expression of such censure by the Legislature, prevent the dangers which attend travel upon this and other similar roads ?

The committee made all the inquiry in their power to ascertain what rules the corporation had adopted for the regulation of the moving power, and their inquiries were fully and frankly answered by the agent, and the chief engineer, who has charge of the whole moving power, between Worcester and Albany.

The arrangement is briefly this : Mr. Whistler is the chief engineer ; the road is divided into three parts ; 1st, between Worcester and Springfield ; 2d, between Springfield and State line ; 3d, between State line and Albany ; each of these divisions is in special charge of a superintendent. Each of these 3 general divisions is subdivided into sections of from 5 to 12 miles each, which are placed under the care of an overseer, each of which has under him, mechanics and laborers, whose business it is to attend to the various kinds of work necessary to be done to keep the road in perfect repair, and safe running order. In addition to this, a standing rule is, that a person shall pass over the various sections of the road, in a hand car,

every morning before the first train is to pass, to see that the road is clear of obstructions, and that no defects exist, which can endanger the train.

A "time-table," as it is called, indicating at what precise moment the train is to be at any station, is in the hands of every person in the employment of the corporation, on the road. Two of these tables are herewith presented, marked B. and C., one showing the time between Worcester and Springfield—the other, between Springfield and Albany. Every person, therefore, connected in any way with the management of the road, or in the service of the corporation, knows when to expect the train from either direction, and is to see that every thing is right for it to pass safely.

It appeared, further, that the directors had been at great pains to collect and compare their rules with those of other similar companies, in this country and in England, with a view to the adoption of those which would produce the greatest security; and they admitted that, after an accident had occurred from some cause not provided against in existing regulations, the happening of the accident itself suggested some new rule which would forever prevent the recurrence of another from a similar cause; and they were themselves surprised that they had not earlier seen the necessity of such new rule.

They say that experience and observation are the best guides in the adoption of rules.

Each agent, under the chief engineer, in all grades of service, is to report, once a month, to the engineer, his operations, for the preceding month, so that the whole management of the road shall, at short, stated intervals, come under the review of the engineer's department. The engineer, also, is often upon the whole line of the road, inspecting its condition, and looking to the conduct of those in the service.

4. The fourth accident was in Richmond, eight miles west of Pittsfield, early in the present month, by which the engine-man and the fireman were killed. The only information we have in relation to this is, that in a deep cut, and a place diffi-

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cult to be kept clear of obstructions, the rails had been somewhat affected by the frost. And although the train from Albany east had passed the same spot safely in the morning, the engine-man going west was informed of the necessity of going slowly, and using great caution while passing that point. And there were men at work in sight, and very near ; yet the train was allowed to run with a speed estimated at 18 or 20 miles an hour, without regard to the warning given, and no person living can tell the cause of the fatal accident.

5. A fifth has occurred the present week, by the falling of a bridge, the cause of which is not yet given to the public.

Your committee will say, in conclusion, that the corporation cannot but feel that it is their own best interest, as well as their duty to the public, to guard, by all the means in their power, against accidents which endanger life and property. They assure us that they constantly endeavor to remedy any defect which experience discovers in their regulations.

The amount of travel on the road is very large. It is impossible that accidents should never happen ; and it would be strange if rail-roads, like stage-coaches, were not sometimes unfortunate. The danger is increased with the increased amount of travel ; but we are not satisfied, from the investigations that we have been able to make, that the directors have been justly chargeable with any neglect of duty, which has caused these accidents. They adopt the regulations which their judgment, aided by experience, pronounces best. They employ men whom they suppose to be the best qualified to discharge the duties required of them : but everything human is fallible ; and so long as we live among men, whether we ride or walk, or wake or sleep, we are exposed to accidents and casualties. And until there is evidence of a neglect to use every reasonable precaution to prevent accidents, on the part of the directors, and while they discharge from service, upon the slightest evidence of negligence, or wantonness, or incompetency, the committee are not prepared to recommend any action which may censure the directors in this matter. It is

hoped that increased vigilance and care will hereafter prevent the recurrence of the accidents which have so alarmed the community; but the committee cannot suggest any legal enactment which can aid in producing this desirable result.

Per order of the committee,

EDW. DICKINSON, *Chairman.*

*Feb.* 18, 1842.

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### A.

#### REPORT ON THE ACCIDENT ON THE WESTERN RAIL-ROAD.

We have been requested to publish the following statement of a committee of three of the most respectable citizens of Springfield, invited to attend the investigation of the causes of the late accident upon the Western Rail-Road. It will be found to embody all the important facts connected with that terrible disaster; and we hope will have a tendency to remove the many erroneous opinions concerning it which have gained favor with the public.

By invitation of the committee of the directors of the Western Railroad Corporation, who are charged with the duty of investigating the causes of the late fatal catastrophe on the road, the undersigned have attended their recent sessions in this town, and heard the evidence which has been laid before the committee. And as many contradictory reports have been in circulation in regard to the occurrence, we have thought it proper to give to the public a statement of the material facts detailed before the committee.

The cars passed over the entire road from Springfield to Pittsfield, for the first time on the morning of Monday the 4th inst. Cards had previously been prepared by Major Whistler, the chief engineer, specifying the exact time at which the different trains were to arrive at and leave each station, on and after Tuesday the 5th instant, and one of these cards was given to each conductor. On Monday, pursuant to a special arrangement for that day, the train which left Pittsfield about 10 A. M., and the train which left Springfield at 12 M. met and passed each other at the Westfield depot at twenty-five minutes past twelve precisely, according to the time-card.

Under the arrangement specified in the card, if neither train had been delayed, they would have again met at Westfield on Tuesday, and passed each other in safety. On that day, the upward train, of which Mr. Moore was conductor, again reached Westfield at twenty-five minutes past twelve, but the downward train had not arrived. Had there not been a modification of pre-existing orders, to which we shall presently advert, it would have been the duty of Moore, under the general order, of which every conductor has a copy, upon finding the train from

the west delayed, to send forward a breakman immediately, and wait thirty minutes before proceeding further with his train. If, at the expiration of thirty minutes, the other train had not arrived, it then would have been his duty to go on to the next station at Chester Village, proceeding, however, with the utmost caution.

So, on the other hand, it would have been the duty of Mr. Warren, the conductor of the downward train, when he found, upon his arrival at Chester Village, where his train was due at fifty-five minutes past 11, that he was behind his time and could not reach Westfield in season, to wait till thirty minutes past the time when the upward train was due at Chester Village, which was fifty-five minutes past 12, and then to proceed with caution.

Such were the duties of the respective conductors under the general arrangement.

As it was found, however, that the detention of the upward train might occasion passengers, who were destined to Hudson, a very serious inconvenience, Mr. Barnes, the master of transportation at Springfield, at the suggestion of Major Whistler, at 11 o'clock on Monday evening, prepared the following order, which he left on a table in his office, where it was usual to deposit papers designed for the conductors, and from which they were required and had been accustomed to take them.

“The train leaving Springfield at 12 M. for Hudson, will have the preference. Therefore, if the train from Hudson is delayed, it will stay back and wait for the train from Springfield. If the train from Springfield is delayed, the train from Hudson will wait one hour behind its time, and then come on, keeping its time just one hour ahead of its true time, so as to arrive in Springfield at 1, 48 P. M., instead of 12, 48.

SPRINGFIELD, Oct. 4, 1841.

J. B.

For Mr. Lee, Conductor.

Show the above to Mr. Warren.”

This paper, which was open, was taken from the table on Tuesday morning, by Mr. Lee, the conductor of the train that left Springfield for the State line at a quarter past 7 A. M., but no verbal directions were given him in regard to it. When he took the paper from the table, he cast his eye over it and remarked to the clerk in the office that it concerned Warren's train, not his own, and he would give it to Warren. Soon after leaving Springfield Mr. Lee read the paper more carefully and noticed the memorandum at the bottom. Lee's train

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should have met Warren's train bound east from the State line at Pittsfield at five minutes past 10, A. M., but Lee did not reach there till twenty-five minutes past 10, and Warren about ten minutes later.

When Warren arrived, Lee with his train was taking in wood a short distance from the passenger-house. He soon after returned to the passenger-house, Warren's train standing on the inside, and his own on the outside track. There was a large collection of persons about the trains, and Lee was immediately spoken to by a passenger in relation to his baggage, and was for a time engaged in attending to his passengers and their baggage, and other appropriate duties. While thus occupied, Warren called to him to know if there had been any alteration of fares. Lee replied to his inquiry, and added that he would see him again. As both trains were much behind their time, there was a good deal of haste in getting ready to start, and consequently, a good deal of confusion. Lee's train was ready first, and the agents at Pittsfield were hurrying him off. With the new order in his hand he started to find Warren. Seeing a man, who had been helping about the baggage, and who he supposed belonged to Warren's train, he asked him where Warren was, and was told "on the other side of the train." This person then asked Lee if he wished to give Warren the letter, and upon Lee's replying in the affirmative, offered to hand it to Warren for him. Lee accordingly gave him the letter, with an injunction to be particular and give it to Warren, and then took his station on his train and started. Upon Lee's return from the State line to Pittsfield, the letter was handed back to him by said person with the remark that he had not given or had forgotten to give it to Warren. Lee afterwards showed it to Mr. S. H. P. Lee, the master of transportation at Pittsfield, and expressed his apprehension that there might be some difficulty, but that gentleman thought all would be right, as Moore and Warren would run cautiously.

Before the train for the west left Springfield Tuesday noon, Moore received from Mr. Barnes verbal information of the order sent to Warren, and was directed, in case the downward train should be behind its time at Westfield, not to wait as usual, but to proceed at once to the next depot, as, by the arrangement of the evening previous, he would be entitled to the road. Accordingly, Moore waited at Westfield only five minutes, to allow for a variation of watches, and then, for the same reason, proceeded rather slowly, increasing his speed as he became certain that the road was clear. He states that he neither felt nor expressed any such apprehensions of meeting the other train, as have

been attributed to him in some of the public prints; and as he had no reason to entertain such fears, it is probable that the report of his having been heard to express them originated in a mistake. In pursuance, however, of what he states is his rule in all cases where a train that is due has not been met, he took his station on the engine.

When about seven miles and a half from Westfield, and at about five minutes before 1, P. M., while Moore's train was moving at the rate of twenty or twenty-three miles an hour, in a short curve of the road, the other train was descried approaching at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour, and although both engines were immediately reversed, and every possible effort seems to have been made to prevent a collision, yet the trains almost instantaneously met, with a terrific shock, the disastrous effects of which are already known.

It being evident that Moore conformed strictly to his instructions, and that no blame can be justly imputed to him, the question arises, how happened the downward train there at that time? Its unfortunate conductor, Warren, was one of the victims of the accident, and the testimony before the committee furnishes no solution of the question.

It will be remembered that he had no knowledge of the new order, and should therefore have been governed by the standing rule already stated, unless he had been otherwise directed; of which there is no evidence.

Just before he reached Chester Factories he was told by Stock, a breakman on his train, that as he was so far behind his time he would not be able to go further than Chester Village, but he replied that Moore was to wait for them at Westfield. At Chester Factories, where his train was due at thirty-seven minutes past 11, A. M. he remarked to Rice, the engineman, that their time to be at Westfield would be up in five minutes, and directed him to make all speed to get there.

He reached Chester Village, the next turnout west of Westfield, and eleven and a half miles from it, at fifteen or twenty minutes before 1, P. M., about fifty minutes behind his regular time, and was therefore bound by the standing order to proceed no further.

But under some strange misapprehension, of the precise nature or source of which we have no evidence, he pressed forward at a speed of twenty-five miles an hour, without any of the usual precautions, and until within a few seconds of the collision, in which he received a fatal injury, evidently anticipated no danger.

In closing this statement it is proper to add, that all the conductors

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whom we have named have sustained a high character as careful, trusty and skilful men, and Warren in particular had been regarded on the Norwich road as a man admirably qualified to conduct the most difficult trains.

Regarding it as our province in this matter rather to ascertain and narrate facts, than to express opinions, we submit this statement to the public without further remark.

THEODORE BLISS,  
CHESTER W. CHAPIN,  
HENRY MORRIS.

SPRINGFIELD, *Oct. 9, 1841.*

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The following is an official statement of the extent of the injury, so far as known, occasioned by the recent disaster on the Western Rail-Road :—

Mr. Warren, the conductor, and a son of Mr. Bloodgood of Albany, have deceased.

Of the passengers who were much injured, Mrs. Bloodgood has a fractured limb.

Of two of the sons of Mr. Bloodgood, one has a broken leg, and the head of the other much bruised.

Mr. Brewer of Westfield, has a leg broken, an arm dislocated, and is seriously bruised.

Mrs. Elliot, wife of Rev. Mr. Elliot of South Carolina, has her arm badly scalded, and a son of theirs has a broken leg.

Rev. Mr. Clark of Boston, Rev. Mr. Boyd of Maryland, Rev. Mr. Pierce of Hudson, (Michigan,) Mrs. Pierce, (wife of Rev. Mr. Pierce,) Mr. William A. Keith of Maine, Miss Crossett, Mr. Watson of Westfield—are more or less injured.

All the above are believed to be doing well, except as regards Mr. Brewer, whose situation is considered as very critical.

Messrs. Denby of Virginia, and Page of Utica, have so far recovered that they have continued their journey.

Ellen Doughty, an Irish woman, was seriously injured—she was in the second-class car.

Messrs. Taylor and Rice, the enginemen, and Knowlton and Stocks, the breakmen, attached to the trains, were wounded, but not dangerously.

There were others of the passengers who were more slightly injured, how many we have not been able to ascertain, as the greater part of them have left the vicinity of the accident.

The engines and cars were much broken up; the damage to them will probably amount to the sum of twelve thousand dollars, but this is a consideration of no moment in comparison with the loss of life and the sufferings of those who were injured.

Year	Passengers	Freight	Income	Expenses	Profit
1840	100,000	2,000,000	1,000,000	800,000	200,000
1841	110,000	2,200,000	1,100,000	900,000	200,000
1842	120,000	2,400,000	1,200,000	1,000,000	200,000
1843	130,000	2,600,000	1,300,000	1,100,000	200,000
1844	140,000	2,800,000	1,400,000	1,200,000	200,000
1845	150,000	3,000,000	1,500,000	1,300,000	200,000
1846	160,000	3,200,000	1,600,000	1,400,000	200,000
1847	170,000	3,400,000	1,700,000	1,500,000	200,000
1848	180,000	3,600,000	1,800,000	1,600,000	200,000
1849	190,000	3,800,000	1,900,000	1,700,000	200,000
1850	200,000	4,000,000	2,000,000	1,800,000	200,000
1851	210,000	4,200,000	2,100,000	1,900,000	200,000
1852	220,000	4,400,000	2,200,000	2,000,000	200,000
1853	230,000	4,600,000	2,300,000	2,100,000	200,000
1854	240,000	4,800,000	2,400,000	2,200,000	200,000
1855	250,000	5,000,000	2,500,000	2,300,000	200,000
1856	260,000	5,200,000	2,600,000	2,400,000	200,000
1857	270,000	5,400,000	2,700,000	2,500,000	200,000
1858	280,000	5,600,000	2,800,000	2,600,000	200,000
1859	290,000	5,800,000	2,900,000	2,700,000	200,000
1860	300,000	6,000,000	3,000,000	2,800,000	200,000

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## B.

[In hands of every man on the road.]

### Western R. R.—**Time Table.**—Dec. 21, 1841.

TIMES WHEN TRAINS ARE TO LEAVE STATIONS.

#### EASTERN TRAINS.

LEAVE	SPRINGFIELD TO WORCESTER.			WORCESTER TO SPRINGFIELD.		
	1st Pass'r.	2d Pass'r.	Freight.	1st Pass'r.	2d Pass'r.	Freight.
Springfield, -	6.45 A. M.	1.15 P. M.	6.00 A. M.	12.15 P. M.	3.15 P. M.	6.03 P. M.
Wilbraham, -	7.05	1.35	6.42	11 57	7.57	5.30
Palmer, - -	7.25*	1.56	7.25*	11.36	7.36	4.46
Brimfield, - -	7.37	2 07	7.46	11.21	7.21	4.16
Warren, - - -	7.53	2.23	8.25	11.06	7.06	3 52
West Brookfield,	8.13	2.43	8.47	10.58	6.58	3.35
South Brookfield,	8.22	2.52	9.03	10.45	6.45	3.14
East Brookfield,	8.29	2.59†	9.18	10.38	6.38	2.59†
Spencer, - -	8.38	3.08	9.39	10.31	6.31	2.39
Charlton, - -	8.53	3.23	10.18‡	10.18‡	6.18	2 09
Clappville, -	9.09	3.39	10.50	9.59	5.59	1.30 P. M.
Worcester, -	9.30	4.00	11.35	9.30 A. M.	5.30 P. M.	12.30 M.

\* 1st Pass. T. to Worcester passes 1st Ft. T. to Worcester at Palmer, at 7 26.

‡ 1st Pass. T. to Springfield passes 1st Ft. T. to Worcester at Charlton, at 10 13.

† 2d Pass. T. to Worcester passes 1st Ft. T. to Springfield at E. Brookfield, at 2 59.

No train shall leave a station under any circumstances before the time specified in the TIME TABLE.

No train shall leave a station immediately preceding the station where another train is expected to pass, unless it has the full time for running as specified in the time table.

The conductors of the freight trains will in all cases keep their trains out of the way of the passenger trains—they must never leave a station

where a passenger train should be, without first receiving positive information of the position of the passenger train.

The clock at the upper depot in Worcester shall be taken to be the standard time, and all conductors before leaving Worcester are required to compare and regulate their time by that clock, and to see that the clocks at all other stations which they pass conform to the standard time. The trains west of Springfield will in like manner be governed by the time at the Springfield depot.

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## C.

[In hands of every man on the road.]

### Western R. R.—Time Table.—Dec. 21, 1841.

TIMES WHEN TRAINS ARE TO LEAVE STATIONS.

#### WESTERN TRAINS.

LEAVE	SPRINGFIELD TO GREENBUSH.			GREENBUSH TO SPRINGFIELD.		
	1st Pass'r.	2d Pass'r.	Freight.	1st Pass'r.	2d Pass'r.	Freight.
Springfield, -	7.00 A. M.	1.00 P. M.	5.30 A. M.	12.30 P. M.	6.30 P. M.	4.20 P. M.
West Springfield,	7.05	1.05	5.34	12.25	6.25	4.15
Westfield, -	7.25	1.25	6.12	12.07	6.07	3.42
Chester Village,	7.55	1.55	7.25	11.37	5.37	2.51
Chester Factories,	8.20*	2.20**	8.20*	11.19	5.19	2.20**
Becket, - -	8.54	2.54	9.26	10.47	4.47	1.19 P. M.
Washington, -	9.10	3.10	9.56	10.33	4.33	12.51
Hinsdale, - -	9.21	3.21	10.22	10.22	4.22	12.30
Dalton, - -	9.33	3.33	10.46	10.08	4.08	12.01 M.
Pittsfield, - -	9.52†	3.52	11.31††	9.52†	3.52	11.31††
Shaker Village,	10.02	4.02	11.59	9.33	3.33	10.48
Richmond, -	10.13‡	4.13	12.25	9.22	3.22	10.13‡
State Line, -	10.27	4.27	12.50	9.13	3.13	9.53
Summit, - -	10.41	4.41	1.08	8.57	2.57	9.30
Chapman's, -	11.01	5.01	1.38	8.37	2.37	8.51
Chatham, - -	11.28	5.28	2.17§	8.17§§	2.17§	8.17§§
Kinderhook, -	11.48	5.48	2.57	7.47	1.47	7.14
Schodaek, -	12.07	6.07	3.38	7.23	1.23	6.20
Greenbush, -	12.25	6.25	4.15	7.00 A. M.	1.00 P. M.	5.30 A. M.

\* 1st Pass. T. to Greenbush passes 1st Ft. T. to Greenbush at C. Factories, at 8.20.

† 1st Pass. T. to Greenbush passes 1st Pass. T. to Springfield at Pittsfield, at 9.52.

‡ 1st Pass. T. to Greenbush passes 1st Ft. T. to Springfield at Richmond, at 10.13.

\*\* 2d Pass. T. to Greenbush passes 1st Ft. T. to Springfield at C. Factories, at 2.20.

|| 2d Pass. T. to Greenbush passes 2d Pass. T. to Springfield at Pittsfield, at 3.52.

||| 1st Pass. T. to Springfield passes 1st Ft. T. to Greenbush at Hinsdale, at 10.22.

†† 1st Ft. T. to Greenbush passes 1st Ft. T. to Springfield at Pittsfield, at 11.31.

§ 2d Pass. T. to Springfield passes 1st Ft. T. to Greenbush at Chatham, at 2.17.

§§ 1st Pass. T. to Springfield passes 1st Ft. T. to Springfield at Chatham, at 8.17.

No train shall leave a station under any circumstances before the time specified in the TIME TABLE.

No train shall leave a station immediately preceding the station where another train is expected to pass, unless it has the full time for running as specified in the time table.

The conductors of the freight trains will in all cases keep their trains out of the way of the passenger trains—they must never leave a station where a passenger train should be, without first receiving positive information of the position of the passenger train.

The *second* passenger trains *to* and *from* Greenbush, *must* pass at *Pittsfield*.

The conductor of the *first* passenger train *to* Greenbush will in all cases keep his train out of the way of the *first* passenger train *from* Greenbush—he will never leave a station where that train should be without first receiving positive information of its position.

The clock at the upper depot in Worcester shall be taken to be the standard time, and all conductors before leaving Worcester are required to compare and regulate their time by that clock, and to see that the clocks at all other stations which they pass conform to the standard time. The trains west of Springfield will in like manner be governed by the time at the Springfield depot.

